[Backport staging-26.05] krb5: 1.22.1 -> 1.22.2 (#528358)

This commit is contained in:
Vladimír Čunát
2026-06-05 18:24:00 +00:00
committed by GitHub
2 changed files with 69 additions and 3 deletions

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
From acea6182e46fff3d1d64a3172cdff307b07ca441 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Greg Hudson <ghudson@mit.edu>
Date: Wed, 8 Apr 2026 17:57:59 -0400
Subject: [PATCH] Fix two NegoEx parsing vulnerabilities
In parse_nego_message(), check the result of the second call to
vector_base() before dereferencing it. In parse_message(), check for
a short header_len to prevent an integer underflow when calculating
the remaining message length.
Reported by Cem Onat Karagun.
CVE-2026-40355:
In MIT krb5 release 1.18 and later, if an application calls
gss_accept_sec_context() on a system with a NegoEx mechanism
registered in /etc/gss/mech, an unauthenticated remote attacker can
trigger a null pointer dereference, causing the process to terminate.
CVE-2026-40356:
In MIT krb5 release 1.18 and later, if an application calls
gss_accept_sec_context() on a system with a NegoEx mechanism
registered in /etc/gss/mech, an unauthenticated remote attacker can
trigger a read overrun of up to 52 bytes, possibly causing the process
to terminate. Exfiltration of the bytes read does not appear
possible.
(cherry picked from commit 2e75f0d9362fb979f5fc92829431a590a130929f)
ticket: 9205
version_fixed: 1.22.3
---
lib/gssapi/spnego/negoex_util.c | 7 ++++++-
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/lib/gssapi/spnego/negoex_util.c b/src/lib/gssapi/spnego/negoex_util.c
index edc5462e844..a65238e5730 100644
--- a/lib/gssapi/spnego/negoex_util.c
+++ b/lib/gssapi/spnego/negoex_util.c
@@ -253,6 +253,10 @@ parse_nego_message(OM_uint32 *minor, struct k5input *in,
offset = k5_input_get_uint32_le(in);
count = k5_input_get_uint16_le(in);
p = vector_base(offset, count, EXTENSION_LENGTH, msg_base, msg_len);
+ if (p == NULL) {
+ *minor = ERR_NEGOEX_INVALID_MESSAGE_SIZE;
+ return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
+ }
for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
extension_type = load_32_le(p + i * EXTENSION_LENGTH);
if (extension_type & EXTENSION_FLAG_CRITICAL) {
@@ -391,7 +395,8 @@ parse_message(OM_uint32 *minor, spnego_gss_ctx_id_t ctx, struct k5input *in,
msg_len = k5_input_get_uint32_le(in);
conv_id = k5_input_get_bytes(in, GUID_LENGTH);
- if (in->status || msg_len > token_remaining || header_len > msg_len) {
+ if (in->status || msg_len > token_remaining ||
+ header_len < (size_t)(in->ptr - msg_base) || header_len > msg_len) {
*minor = ERR_NEGOEX_INVALID_MESSAGE_SIZE;
return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
}

View File

@@ -34,16 +34,20 @@
stdenv.mkDerivation (finalAttrs: {
pname = "krb5";
version = "1.22.1";
version = "1.22.2";
__structuredAttrs = true;
src = fetchurl {
url = "https://kerberos.org/dist/krb5/${lib.versions.majorMinor finalAttrs.version}/krb5-${finalAttrs.version}.tar.gz";
hash = "sha256-GogyuMrZI+u/E5T2fi789B46SfRgKFpm41reyPoAU68=";
hash = "sha256-MkP/vI6k1Kwi3cfdKh3FTFeHTEBki2D/lwCXY1VOrxM=";
};
patches = lib.optionals stdenv.hostPlatform.isFreeBSD [
patches = [
# https://github.com/krb5/krb5/pull/1506
./CVE-2026-40355-and-CVE-2026-40356.patch
]
++ lib.optionals stdenv.hostPlatform.isFreeBSD [
(fetchpatch {
name = "fix-missing-ENODATA.patch";
url = "https://cgit.freebsd.org/ports/plain/security/krb5-122/files/patch-lib_krad_packet.c?id=0501f716c4aff7880fde56e42d641ef504593b7d";
@@ -170,6 +174,7 @@ stdenv.mkDerivation (finalAttrs: {
];
meta = {
changelog = "https://web.mit.edu/Kerberos/krb5-${lib.versions.majorMinor finalAttrs.version}/";
description = "MIT Kerberos 5";
homepage = "http://web.mit.edu/kerberos/";
license = lib.licenses.mit;