Fixes#24343. These parts of upstream texlive are really ugly.
Also improve variable quoting in the code around.
(cherry picked from commit 8dddd2b672)
The change seems safe enough.
It's not critical functionality and AFAICT only fails in environments
that wouldn't benefit from "successfully" installing it anyway.
Fixes#24709Fixes#24821
(cherry picked from commit 4f4ae214a3a46ba83f790d23c0e9df0bf9f04215)
Done by setting PATH and PYTHONPATH appropriately.
Adds the following patches:
* One that removes hardcodes to /sbin, /usr/bin, etc.
from gluster, so that programs like `lvm` and `xfs_info` can be
called at runtime; see https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1450546.
* One that fixes unsubstituted autoconf macros in paths (a problem
in the 3.10 release); see https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1450588.
* One that removes uses of the `find_library()` Python function that does
not behave as expected in Python < 3.6 (and would not behave correctly
even on 3.6 in nixpkgs due to #25763);
see https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1450593.
I think that all of these patches should be upstreamed.
Also adds tests to check that none of the Python based utilities
throw import errors, calling `--help` or equivalent on them.
This is because the source tarball available on
https://download.gluster.org/pub/gluster/glusterfs/3.10/3.10.1/glusterfs-3.10.1.tar.gz
has different contents than the v3.10.1 tag;
for example, it lacks the file `xlators/features/ganesha/src/Makefile.am`,
which the tag has.
This is because GluserFS's release process removes some unused files.
This made impossible to apply patches written by or for upstream, as those
are written against what's in upstream's git.
As a nice side effect, we no longer have to hardcode the "3.10" in the
`3.10/${version}` part of the URL.
XSA-216 Issue Description:
> The block interface response structure has some discontiguous fields.
> Certain backends populate the structure fields of an otherwise
> uninitialized instance of this structure on their stacks, leaking
> data through the (internal or trailing) padding field.
More: https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-216.html
XSA-217 Issue Description:
> Domains controlling other domains are permitted to map pages owned by
> the domain being controlled. If the controlling domain unmaps such a
> page without flushing the TLB, and if soon after the domain being
> controlled transfers this page to another PV domain (via
> GNTTABOP_transfer or, indirectly, XENMEM_exchange), and that third
> domain uses the page as a page table, the controlling domain will have
> write access to a live page table until the applicable TLB entry is
> flushed or evicted. Note that the domain being controlled is
> necessarily HVM, while the controlling domain is PV.
More: https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-217.html
XSA-218 Issue Description:
> We have discovered two bugs in the code unmapping grant references.
>
> * When a grant had been mapped twice by a backend domain, and then
> unmapped by two concurrent unmap calls, the frontend may be informed
> that the page had no further mappings when the first call completed rather
> than when the second call completed.
>
> * A race triggerable by an unprivileged guest could cause a grant
> maptrack entry for grants to be "freed" twice. The ultimate effect of
> this would be for maptrack entries for a single domain to be re-used.
More: https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-218.html
XSA-219 Issue Description:
> When using shadow paging, writes to guest pagetables must be trapped and
> emulated, so the shadows can be suitably adjusted as well.
>
> When emulating the write, Xen maps the guests pagetable(s) to make the final
> adjustment and leave the guest's view of its state consistent.
>
> However, when mapping the frame, Xen drops the page reference before
> performing the write. This is a race window where the underlying frame can
> change ownership.
>
> One possible attack scenario is for the frame to change ownership and to be
> inserted into a PV guest's pagetables. At that point, the emulated write will
> be an unaudited modification to the PV pagetables whose value is under guest
> control.
More: https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-219.html
XSA-220 Issue Description:
> Memory Protection Extensions (MPX) and Protection Key (PKU) are features in
> newer processors, whose state is intended to be per-thread and context
> switched along with all other XSAVE state.
>
> Xen's vCPU context switch code would save and restore the state only
> if the guest had set the relevant XSTATE enable bits. However,
> surprisingly, the use of these features is not dependent (PKU) or may
> not be dependent (MPX) on having the relevant XSTATE bits enabled.
>
> VMs which use MPX or PKU, and context switch the state manually rather
> than via XSAVE, will have the state leak between vCPUs (possibly,
> between vCPUs in different guests). This in turn corrupts state in
> the destination vCPU, and hence may lead to weakened protections
>
> Experimentally, MPX appears not to make any interaction with BND*
> state if BNDCFGS.EN is set but XCR0.BND{CSR,REGS} are clear. However,
> the SDM is not clear in this case; therefore MPX is included in this
> advisory as a precaution.
More: https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-220.html
XSA-221 Issue Description:
> When polling event channels, in general arbitrary port numbers can be
> specified. Specifically, there is no requirement that a polled event
> channel ports has ever been created. When the code was generalised
> from an earlier implementation, introducing some intermediate
> pointers, a check should have been made that these intermediate
> pointers are non-NULL. However, that check was omitted.
More: https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-221.html
XSA-222 Issue Description:
> Certain actions require removing pages from a guest's P2M
> (Physical-to-Machine) mapping. When large pages are in use to map
> guest pages in the 2nd-stage page tables, such a removal operation may
> incur a memory allocation (to replace a large mapping with individual
> smaller ones). If this allocation fails, these errors are ignored by
> the callers, which would then continue and (for example) free the
> referenced page for reuse. This leaves the guest with a mapping to a
> page it shouldn't have access to.
>
> The allocation involved comes from a separate pool of memory created
> when the domain is created; under normal operating conditions it never
> fails, but a malicious guest may be able to engineer situations where
> this pool is exhausted.
More: https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-222.html
XSA-224 Issue Description:
> We have discovered a number of bugs in the code mapping and unmapping
> grant references.
>
> * If a grant is mapped with both the GNTMAP_device_map and
> GNTMAP_host_map flags, but unmapped only with host_map, the device_map
> portion remains but the page reference counts are lowered as though it
> had been removed. This bug can be leveraged cause a page's reference
> counts and type counts to fall to zero while retaining writeable
> mappings to the page.
>
> * Under some specific conditions, if a grant is mapped with both the
> GNTMAP_device_map and GNTMAP_host_map flags, the operation may not
> grab sufficient type counts. When the grant is then unmapped, the
> type count will be erroneously reduced. This bug can be leveraged
> cause a page's reference counts and type counts to fall to zero while
> retaining writeable mappings to the page.
>
> * When a grant reference is given to an MMIO region (as opposed to a
> normal guest page), if the grant is mapped with only the
> GNTMAP_device_map flag set, a mapping is created at host_addr anyway.
> This does *not* cause reference counts to change, but there will be no
> record of this mapping, so it will not be considered when reporting
> whether the grant is still in use.
More: https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-224.html
(cherry picked and adapted from commit 80e0cda7ff)
Adds /dev/disk/by-{id,label}/* symlinks for bcache device nodes, in the
final rootfs.
Symlinks will only be created for bcache devices that contain
filesystems. So if you have a blank bcache device or run LVM on top of
bcache you will not get this kind of symlink.
(cherry picked from commit 5b48368386)
Or else `services.udev.packages = [ bcache-tools ]` cannot be used.
To not break bcache in the initrd I'm modifying this in stage-1.nix:
- --replace /bin/sh ${extraUtils}/bin/sh
+ --replace ${bash}/bin/sh ${extraUtils}/bin/sh
Reasoning behind that change:
* If not modifying the /bin/sh pattern in any way, it will also match
${bash}/bin/sh, creating a broken path like
/nix/store/HASH-bash/nix/store/HASH-bash/bin/sh in the udev rule file.
* The addition of /bin/sh was done in 775f381a9e
("stage-1: add bcache support"). It seems somewhat plausible that
no new users have appeared since then and we can take this opportunity
to back out of this change without much fear of regressions.
If there _are_ regressions, they should be in the form of build time
errors, not runtime (boot), due to how the udev rule output is checked
for invalid path references. So low risk, IMHO.
* An alternative approach could be to copy the /bin/sh substitute rule
over to the non-initrd udev rules implementation in NixOS, but I think
this way is better:
- The rules file comes with a working path out of the box.
- We can use more precise pattern matching when modifying the udev
rules for the initrd.
(cherry picked from commit 581226cfb4)
So that
$ nix-build -A bcache-tools.src
gives
/nix/store/HASH-bcache-tools-1.0.7.tar.gz
instead of
/nix/store/HASH-v1.0.7.tar.gz
(cherry picked from commit f12b0a2179)
